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THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1976: A MEANINGFUL STEP
TOWARD THE ELIMINATION OF
CREDIT DISCRIMINATION
Although there is no constitutional right to receive credit, the use of credit
has in recent years become a virtually indispensable commodity.' Recogniz-
ing its importance, Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
19742 to insure that credit is not denied arbitrarily or capriciously on the basis
of sex or marital status. While the enactment of legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination in the granting of credit is certainly a praiseworthy objective, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 has been criticized by many for its
failure to cover a number of areas of known discrimination and to act as a
significant deterrent to continuing discrimination.
In enacting legislation regarding credit discrimination, Congress was faced
with the formidable task of balancing a number of competing interests. The
needs of the consumer were to be of paramount concern. 3 The lending insti-
tution, however, has a property right at stake in that it owns the money which
the consumer seeks to borrow. A balance must be struck between the cred-
itor's need for protection from financial loss and the borrower's need for
credit.4 It is essential that creditors be allowed to consider information about
the credit applicant that is relevant to the formation of financially sound de-
cisions. To prohibit the consideration of such criteria would be a disservice
to consumers, since the cost and availability of credit will vary proportion-
ately to the risk of loss that creditors are forced to undertake.5
1. See Hearings on S. 483, S. 1927 & H.R. 6516 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings]. Senator Biden noted that "vir-
tually all home purchases, probably two-thirds of all automobile sales and more than
half of major department store sales are on credit .... ." See also 122 CONG. REc.
1018 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1976) (remarks of Senator Biden). Outstanding consumer credit
is growing at a phenomenal rate. It now stands at almost $200 billion, excluding family
mortgage credit which would add more than $400 billion to that total. id.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V, 1975).
3. Cf. Statement of Robert B. Norris, General Counsel, National Consumer Finance
Association, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 615.
4. See 122 CONG. REc. 1019 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1976) (remarks of Senator Biden).
5. It is not in the borrower's best interest to be given credit if he is unable to
repay the debt. The purpose of screening applicants is to determine who will be likely
to have financial problems if given credit. Financial difficulties may lead to destroyed
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The 1976 amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 6 are an at-
tempt to balance these competing needs and to establish a clear national pol-
icy that no one shall be denied the credit he wants or needs on the basis
of criteria having nothing to do with credit-worthiness. 7 The purpose of this
article is to interpret and evaluate these amendments through an examina-
tion of their legislative history and to discuss their probable impact on the
credit industry.
I. THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1974
Although the use of credit has been an integral part of the American mar-
ketplace for many years," the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 was the
first comprehensive legislative attempt to prevent credit discrimination. Con-
gress had previously passed consumer credit legislation in the Truth in
Lending Act 9 and the Fair Credit Billing Act,10 but the area of credit dis-
crimination had never been dealt with directly." The Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act of 1974 prohibits discrimination by a creditor "against any appli-
cant on the basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction."'1 2 By enacting such legislation, Congress intended to insure that
those engaged in the extension of credit would make credit available with
fairness and impartiality. It was also believed that economic stabilization
and competition would be strengthened by the absence of discrimination on
the basis of sex and marital status.' 3
The Act authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe such regula-
tions as are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the legislation.' 4  Pur-
suant to this authority, the Board issued a series of regulations collectively
known as Regulation B.' 5 These regulations deal primarily with two areas:
credit records and other social problems as well. Testimony of Richard E. Cremer.
Assistant Corporate Credit Manager for Montgomery Ward [hereinafter cited as Cremer
Testimony], 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 456.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V, 1975).
7. 122 CONG. REC. 1018 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1976) (remarks of Senator Biden).
8. See generally Cremer Testimony, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 447-48.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970).
10. Id. § 1666 (Supp. V, 1975).
11. 121 CONG. REC. 4789 (1975) (remarks of Congresswoman Sullivan). Ms. Sulli-
van stated that when the House began its hearings in 1972, to her knowledge there
was not a single law in any state or a single bill in Congress to prohibit credit discrimi-
nation by sex or marital status.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
13. Id. § 1691.
14. Id. § 1691b. The Board is given similar rulemaking powers under the Truth
in Lending Act. Id. § 1604 (1970).
15. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1976).
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criteria which may not be considered by creditors in extending credit, and
the furnishing of credit information to consumer reporting agencies.
To facilitate the bill's intent to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex
or marital status, Regulation B prohibits the consideration of certain factors
by creditors in making their decision to extend credit. Lending institutions
may not make inquiries regarding an applicant's marital status' 6 or childbear-
ing intentions, 17 nor may they discount the income of an applicant or the ap-
plicant's spouse"" or refuse to issue separate accounts on the basis of sex or
marital status.19 Additionally, sex and marital status may not be used as
variables in a credit scoring system.
20
One of the greatest obstacles that women encounter in attempting to obtain
credit is the lack of a credit history. This is due to the fact that credit infor-
mation regarding married couples is traditionally reported only in the hus-
band's name. Regulation B attempts to alleviate this problem by requiring
creditors to determine whether the account is one for which both spouses will
be contractually liable and if so to designate the account to reflect the partici-
pation of both spouses. 2' Creditors are also required to notify applicants of
any action taken on their application and, if requested, to provide reasons
for such action. 22
Overall administrative authority for the Act and the regulations rests with
the Federal Trade Commission, 23 with parallel authority granted to various
other federal agencies.2 4 In the case of noncompliance by a creditor, an ag-
16. Id. § 202.4(c)(1). A creditor may, however, make inquiries about marital status
for the purpose of ascertaining his rights and remedies regarding the particular extension
of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (Supp. V, 1975). For example, in some cases property
cannot be mortgaged without the consent of both the husband and wife. However, if
the creditor asks the applicant's marital status, only the terms "married," "unmarried," or
"separated" may be used. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(c) (2) (1976).
17. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(h) (1976).
18. Id. § 202.5(e).
19. Id. § 202.4(b).
20. Id. § 202.5(f). Credit scoring is a method of determining credit-worthiness by
assigning numerical values to the various factors presented by each applicant and making
the decision to grant credit on the basis of the total score. Cremer Testimony, 1975
Hearings, supra note 1, at 441. In contrast, granting credit merely on the basis of
the creditor's judgment is an art rather than a science. When this method is used,
it is virtually impossible to show the existence of prejudice or to verify the truth of
any reason given for rejection. Id. at 445-46.
21. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.6(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1976). See also id.
§ 202.9(a)(1), which requires creditors to retain the original or a copy of any applica-
tion form and all written information used in granting or denying credit for 15 months.
22. Id. §§ 202.5(m)(1)(2).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
24. Id. §§ 1691c(a)(l)-(9). Administrative enforcement of the Act with respect to
19761
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grieved applicant may institute civil proceedings for preventive relief in the
form of an injunction or a restraining order.2 5  Additionally, the applicant
may institute proceedings to recover actual and punitive damages in an indi-
vidual capacity or as the representative of a class.2 6
Although the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 was a significant ini-
tial breakthrough in the area of credit discrimination, it was far too limited
in scope and it left many areas of discrimination untouched. Evidence was
presented in 1974, at hearings before the House Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs, regarding the need for legislation dealing with credit discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and age.27  Nevertheless,
before the full committee was able to act upon these recommendations, a
weak antidiscrimination bill was agreed upon by the House and Senate con-
ferees. 25
The most vigorous criticisms of the Act have been directed at its enforce-
ment provisions. Consumer groups maintain that these provisions are inade-
quate to insure compliance by creditors. 29 Because overall enforcement pow-
ers are delegated to the Federal Trade Commission, any violation of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act is subject to the same disciplinary action as
a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 0 and the Commission may
certain creditors is assigned to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Administrator of the National
Credit Union Administration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Farm Credit Administration, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Small Business Administration. Id. It was neces-
sary to delegate parallel authority to these institutions because the FTC does not have
jurisdiction over banking institutions. Id. § 45 (1970). See also id. § 1691c(b) (Supp.
V, 1975). Any violation of the regulation of the agencies is deemed to be a viola-
tion of the Act itself.
25. Id. § 1691e(d).
26. Id. §§ 1691e(a)-(c). The applicant may pursue the remedies provided by the
Act in lieu of, but not in addition to, any remedies provided by state law. Id. § 1691d
(e).
27. 122 CONG. REc. 1708-10 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1976) (remarks of Congresswoman
Sullivan).
28. 121 CONG. REC. 4789 (1975) (remarks of Congresswoman Sullivan). The
House conferees of another subcommittee went to conference with the Senate on a bank
deposit insurance bill to which the Senate had attached its consumer credit bill. The
House conferees agreed to the Senate riders and the conference report came before the
House under a rule waiving points of order against nongermane Senate amendments.
It was therefore impossible to obtain separate votes on the individual provisions of the
Senate amendments. The House was forced to decide whether to pass, defeat or recom-
mit the entire conference report which included provisions that were desperately needed
by the home building industry.
29. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Congresswoman Sullivan).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
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use the powers delegated to it under that Act to deal with the violation.81
At the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, how-
ever, a representative from the Commission pointed out that it lacks the re-
sources to achieve effective compliance. 32  Pursuant to the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Commission is only empowered to issue cease and de-
sist orders in the case of noncompliance by a creditor.3 3 Consequently, ag-
grieved applicants must rely on individual or class action suits to assert their
rights and to recover any damages they may have suffered. Consumer advo-
cates maintained that the original ceiling of recovery for punitive damages
discouraged the institution of suits and was an inadequate deterrent for credi-
tors.3
4
The original Equal Credit Opportunity Act has also come under heavy crit-
icism from creditors. Although the general purposes of the Act were easy
to state, the problems involved in its day-to-day operation were great. Reg-
ulation B has been attacked by creditors as unclear, overly complicated, and
burdensome .3  The Act itself simply prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex or marital status, but creditors claim that the numerous regulations im-
plementing the Act increase the complexity of the legislation and enhance
the possibility of litigation. 6
II. THE 1976 AMENDMENTS
The amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 37 must be viewed
31. Id. § 1691c(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
32. Testimony of Sheldon Feldman, Assistant Director for Special Statutes, Federal
Trade Commission [hereinafter cited as Feldman Testimony], 1975 Hearings, supra note
1, at 218.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). In the case of noncompliance with an order of the
Commission, violators are subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. id. §
45(1). Other agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement powers have the same
problem. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1970). In the case of national banks, mem-
ber banks of the Federal Reserve System, and banks insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Board of Directors of the FDIC can issue cease and desist
orders.
34. Under the original Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the ceiling of recovery for
punitive damages was $10,000 in an individual action and the lesser of $100,000 or
one per centum of the creditor's net worth in a class action. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691b(e)-
(c) (Supp. V, 1975). To date, no reported cases have been brought under the provi-
sions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
35. Letter from the International Consumer Credit Association, 1975 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 587. The Association maintained that Regulation B is "so unreasonable,
uncertain, contradictory and indefinite that it is not only unconstitutional but also im-
possible in compliance for almost any creditor." Id.
36. Letter from Dawson, Riddell, Taylor, Davis, & Holroyd, 1975 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 575-76.
37. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Supp. 2, 1976).
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both as a natural extension of the original Act and as an attempt to correct
its deficiencies. The amendments expand the scope of prohibited discrimina-
tion to include race, color, religion, national origin, and age.38  They prohibit
a refusal to extend credit solely because the applicant receives public assist-
ance"0 or has exercised his rights under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. 40 The enforcement provisions of the Act have also been extended. The
ceiling of potential recovery of punitive damages in a class action was raised
to the "lesser of $500,000 or one per centum of the net worth of the cred-
itor"; 41 the Attorney General of the United States is authorized to commence
a civil action in "pattern and practice" cases; 42 and a Consumer Advisory
Council is to be established to render advice concerning the Act and other
consumer related matters.4 3  As a further deterrent, and to aid in the en-
forcement of the Act, a written statement of reasons for denial of credit must
be furnished to an applicant upon request.44
A. Expansion of the Scope of Prohibited Discrimination
Prior to the enactment of most antidiscrimination legislation, an initial de-
termination that the alleged discrimination does in fact exist has to be made.
Adding unnecessary categories of prohibited discrimination could have the ef-
fect of weakening a bill by overburdening the courts and diffusing the en-
forcement efforts of the regulatory agencies.45  In drafting the amendments
to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, however, because race, color, religion,
38. Id. § 1691(a)(1).
39. Id. § 1691(a)(2).
40. Id. § 1691(a)(3). The Consumer Credit Protection Act is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (Supp. V, 1975). The Act grants consumers the right to sue for actual
and punitive damages if a creditor fails to disclose the terms of the credit transaction
as required by the Act, id. § 1640, or if a creditor reports unauthorized or inaccurate
credit information, id. § 1681n.
41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b) (Supp. 2, 1976).
42. Id. § 1691e(h). "Pattern and practice" suits refer to those cases in which a
creditor discriminates against certain kinds of applicants on a regular basis.
43. Id. § 1691b(b).
44. Id. § 1691(d) (2). Regulation B previously required that a statement of reasons
for denial be given, but the statement could be oral. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 202.5(m)(l)-(2) (1976).
45. Testimony of J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice [hereinafter cited as Pottinger Testimony], 1975 Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 318. See also Testimony of Jim Godfrey, representing the Amer-
ican Retail Federation, 1975 Hcarings, supra note 1, at 403. Arguing that credit
legislation should address the real problems faced by credit applicants, Mr. Godfrey
maintained that to add unnecessary criteria would "dilute the force of the original
legislation, increase costs to credit grantors, and ultimately result in . . . an unwarranted
redrction in credit availability." ld.
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and national origin are standard classifications in civil rights legislation, it was
felt that reasons should be presented for excluding those categories from cov-
erage rather than requiring justification for their inclusion.40
This reasoning does not apply to the inclusion of the categories of age and
receipt of public assistance. In these areas, evidence of discrimination was
considered necessary. At the hearings before the Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Affairs, the American Association of Retired Persons presented sub-
stantial evidence that age discrimination in the granting of credit does in fact
exist.47  Statistics were cited showing that persons between the ages of 55
and 64 are actually the most credit-worthy group.48 Furthermore, the great-
est bulk of savings accounts were stated to be held by persons over the age
of 60. Ironically, in the absence of legislative protection, the elderly were
providing funds for loans to younger persons and yet were denied an ade-
quate opportunity to obtain credit themselves.49
While the prohibitions regarding race, color, religion, and national origin
are absolute, the amendments permit a creditor to inquire about the age of
the applicant to determine whether he has the capacity to contract 0 and to
determine the probable continuance of his level of income. 51 Creditors may
also make use of a statistically sound credit scoring system that'considers age
as long as elderly applicants are not assigned a negative value. 5
2
While no statistical evidence was presented regarding discrimination
against recipients of public assistance, Congress felt it was intolerable that
46. See Pottinger Testimony, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 318. It was argued
that discrimination in these areas is repugnant to the basic values of a democratic soci-
Sety. Id. at 331.
47. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 76-92. A substantial number of letters from
elderly persons who had been denied credit or had had their credit revoked upon reach-
ing a particular age were submitted as evidence by the American Association of Retired
Persons. See also 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Senator Brock).
Congress was especially concerned about the elderly since they are becoming more com-
mon victims of crime, making the possession of credit cards and checking accounts
a necessary safety precaution.
48. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
49. Testimony of John B. Martin, Legislative Consultant, National Retired Teachers
Association and The American Association of Retired Persons, 1975 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 99.
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (Supp. 2, 1976).
51. id. § 1691(b)(2). See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 8 (remarks of Sena-
tor Brock). If the applicant is 60 years of age and if the mandatory retirement age
is 65, the creditor may take this factor into account. An example frequently cited at
the hearings was the case of an 85-year old man applying for a 30-year mortgage. In
such a case, age is admittedly a valid factor to consider.
52. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(3) (Supp. 2, 1976). See notes 102-04 & accompanying
text infra.
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such recipients should be disadvantaged solely because of the source of their
income. 5 Creditors criticized the attempt to eliminate this factor in credit de-
terminations on several grounds: first, there was no demonstrated need for
statutory protection; second, creditors must be able to distinguish between
stable and unstable sources of income; and third, such applicants would rarely
qualify for bank card credit in any case. 54 The provision would seem to over-
come these objections since it simply prohibits consideration of the nature of
the applicant's income, 5  while allowing creditors to make inquiries regarding
the amount and frequency of payments. 56
The amendments also provide for the continuance of special programs for
economically disadvantaged persons,57 credit assistance programs offered by
nonprofit organizations for the benefit of their members,", and programs de-
signed to accommodate "special social needs." 59  The last category was
added to allow profit-making organizations to establish special programs de-
signed to increase access to the credit market by persons previously fore-
closed.60
B. More Effective Enforcement Provisions
One of the most controversial additions to the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act is the requirement that a written explanation of reasons for adverse ac-
tion be given to an applicant upon request.61 This provision serves to dis-
53. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1976).
54. Testimony of John A. Dillon, Executive Vice President, National BankAmeri-
card, Inc., 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 362.
55. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 637 (1976).
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(2) (Supp. 2, 1976). The public assistance category is
intended to be read broadly to include all federal, state, or local government assistance
programs. The legislation is not, however, intended to require the extension of credit
to individuals whose incomes are low or marginal. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 639 (1976).
57. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(c)(1) (Supp. 2, 1976). In this situation, the class of per-
sons to be benefited will be defined by federal or state law. Fed. Res. Bd. Press Re-
lease (Jul. 15, 1976) at 25.
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(c)(2) (Supp. 2, 1976). This section allows credit unions
to refuse to extend credit to non-members. Fed. Res. Bd. Press Release (Jul. 15, 1976)
at 26.
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(c) (3) (Supp. 2, 1976).
60. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 641 (1976). This provision of the Act
allows creditors offering special assistance programs to refuse to extend credit on a pro-
hibited basis without violating the Act. Although the proposed regulations also exempted
creditors who were offering special assistance programs from providing a notice of
action taken or a statement of reasons for denial, Fed. Res. Bd. Press Release (Jul. 15,
1976) at 25, the final regulations deleted this provision, believing that the beneficiaries
of these programs should be accorded the same rights as other applicants. 42 Fed.
Reg. 1247 (1977).
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(2) (Supp. 2, 1976). See also 1975 Hearings, supra note
1, at 26 (supplemental statement by Congresswoman Sullivan). It was the intent of
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courage discrimination, 62 to point out to the applicant the manner in which
his credit status is deficient,63 and to facilitate the administration of the en-
forcement provisions of the Act. 64 In drafting the amendments, much debate
focused on the issue of whether written reasons for adverse action should be
furnished automatically, upon request, or not at all. The criticism most fre-
quently directed at the "automatic" provision was that it would be unduly
burdensome and costly. 65 Consumer representatives, however, felt that such
a provision was necessary to assure compliance. A compromise was reached
by requiring a written explanation only upon request of the applicant. 66
A second issue of great concern to creditors was the content necessary
to constitute a sufficient statement of reasons for denying credit. Under the
regulations prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the original
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, this had proven to be a very troublesome
issue.67 As a result of the Senate hearings, it was agreed that a "check-list"
letter in which the creditor merely checks off the reason for denial would
be sufficient for purposes of the Act.
Among the changes in the civil liability provisions of the Act, the provision
raising the ceiling of possible recovery in class action suits aroused a great
deal of dispute. The proposed Senate amendment recommended that the
ceiling be raised to "the greater of $50,000 or one per centum of the net
worth of the creditor." 68 The purpose behind setting any ceiling is to limit
Congress to clearly spell out this provision to avoid accusations that the Federal Reserve
Board was not authorized to prescribe such a regulation.
62. Creditors rarely furnish rejected applicants with even a cursory explanation for
their action. Their apparent rationale is that since they have no legal obligation to
do so, they will not venture the effort or risk potential embarrassment. S. REP. No.
589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 641 (1976).
63. It was thought that knowledge of the reasons for adverse action would ultimately
have a "beneficial educational effect on the credit-consuming public and a beneficial
competitive effect on the credit marketplace." Id.
64. Since discrimination is "inherently insidious, almost presumptively intentional,
yet often difficult to detect and ferret out ...... strong enforcement is essential. Id.
at 647.
65. Testimony of Forrest D. Jones, on behalf of the American Bankers Association,
1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 264-65. See also id. at 285. In 1973, it cost $3.31
to dictate, type, mail, and file a business letter.
66. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 2, 1976). See also id. § 1691(d)(5).
This latter provision was added to protect small businesses. A verbal statement of rea-
sons is sufficient in the case of "any creditor who did not act on more than one hundred
and fifty applications during the calendar year preceding the calendar year in which
the adverse action is taken ...."
67. Creditors claimed that a number of factors are considered in making a credit de-
cision, no one of which is controlling. It is therefore difficult to articulate the specific
reasons for denial in a clear and meaningful fashion. Statement of Interbank Card
Association on S. 1927, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 585.
68. S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(b) (1975).
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the exposure of creditors to vast judgments the size of which would depend
on the number of members in the plaintiff's class. 69 At the same time, there
was concern that if the ceiling were too low, potential plaintiffs would be dis-
suaded from bringing a class action.
70
Creditors argued that the present ceiling on recoveries was an adequate
deterrent, since most creditors would comply with the Act to avoid the poten-
tial damage to their reputation from involvement in litigation.71 It was also
felt that the higher ceiling could bankrupt smaller businesses and would allow
excessive recovery in the case of large corporations. 72 A third concern was
that a higher ceiling would encourage vexatious litigation. 73 Consumer advo-
cates argued that an increased ceiling was necessary to ensure compliance.
74
Evidence was presented to show that judges generally refrain from granting
the maximum allowable recovery.7 5 Furthermore, the higher ceiling would
tend to encourage more private enforcement, thereby decreasing the need for
governmental enforcement and reducing government costs. 76 To reconcile
creditor and consumer interests, a compromise provision was adopted, which
set the ceiling at "the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the creditor's
net worth. '77
Because strong enforcement is essential in civil rights legislation, it was felt
that alternative remedies should be available to aggrieved applicants. Conse-
69. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 647 (1976).
70. Under the original Equal Credit Opportunity Act, if there were more than 10
members in the class, the class' recovery was less than the recovery in equivalent in-
dividual suits. 122 CONG. REC. 1019 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1976) (remarks of Senator
Biden).
71. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 307.
72. Id. at 303 (remarks of Senator Gain).
73. Pottinger Testimony id. at 334. See also Letter from M.M. Whitmore, Manager,
Credit Policy & Control Division, Standard Oil Company, 1975 Hearings, supra note
1, at 635. The Standard Oil Company recommended that a provision be added under
which the court could, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney's fees to defendants,
if it was found that the suit had been brought either on frivolous grounds or out of
ill will by the plaintiff.
74. See Testimony of Benny Kass, Attorney, Washington, D.C., 1975 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 301. Mr. Kass argued that "the $100,000 maximum, may be a very cheap
price to pay when extra charges to the consumer in effect have benefitted to the coffers
of that individual creditor much more than $100,000."
75. The courts have clearly demonstrated that they have no intention of permitting
mammoth class action judgments in cases based on purely technical violations. See
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The
size of a class action judgment should depend on "the amount of actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the
resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to
which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional." 1975 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 17 (remarks of Congresswoman Sullivan).
76. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 210 (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b) (Supp. 2, 1976).
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quently, a new provision was added to the civil liability section of the Act
which authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to institute pro-
ceedings either on referral from the administrative agencies responsible for
enforcement78 or on his own initiative in the case of "pattern and practice"
suits. 79 This provision is based on the assumption that the Justice Depart-
ment's experience in civil rights legislation can be utilized to achieve maxi-
mum compliance under the Act.80 Furthermore, while the other federal
agencies are empowered only to issue cease and desist orders, the Attorney
General is authorized to commence a civil action for injunctive or such other
relief as may be appropriate. 8' Additionally, both the Attorney General and
the Federal Reserve Board are required to issue annual reports to Congress
on the performance of their respective functions under the Act.8 2
A provision was also added authorizing the establishment of a Consumer
Advisory Council,83 which would absorb the already existing Truth in Lend-
ing Advisory Committee.84 Members of this council are to be chosen so as
to achieve a fair representation of the interests of both creditors and consum-
ers. 85 The chief functions of the Council are to advise and consult with the
Federal Reserve Board regarding the Board's responsibilities under the Act
and to facilitate a uniform and coordinated approach to consumer legisla-
tion.86
111. THE AMENDMENTS' POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE
CREDIT INDUSTRY
A. Written Explanations
While passage of the amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
78. Id. § 1691e(g).
79. Id. § 1691e(h).
80. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 647 (1976). "Pattern and practice" suits
by the Attorney General have been effective in achieving compliance with other civil
rights statutes. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 26 (supplemental statement of Congress-
woman Sullivan).
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(h) (Supp. 2, 1976).
82. Id. § 1691f.
83. Id. § 1691b(b).
84. Early drafts of the bill called for a separate advisory committee on the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act similar to the advisory committee established under the Truth
in Lending Act. However, the Federal Reserve Board urged the subcommittee to create
an advisory council with broader responsibility to render advice concerning the entire
Consumer Protection Act. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 645 (1976). This
provision has the additional advantage of requiring no additional cost to the government
for the establishment of a new council. Id. at 649.
85. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691b(b) (Supp. 2, 1976).
86. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 645-46 (1976).
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is a significant step toward assuring equal access to credit, opponents of the
bill have criticized the requirement of a written explanation for denial of
credit as being counterproductive, since any increase in costs to creditors will
ultimately be passed on to consumers . 7 In all likelihood, this fear should
prove to be unwarranted. At the hearings before the Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Affairs, Werner H. Kamarsky, the Commissioner of the Human Rights
Division for New York, testified that a written denial requirement in the
New York Human Rights Act 8 had not proven to be unduly burdensome.89
Since a letter of denial is customarily sent to applicants in any case, compli-
ance with the provision will simply entail the addition of a paragraph explain-
ing the reasons for the denial. °0
A countervailing concern of consumer advocates is that without written
statements, the filing of legitimate complaints will be discouraged. 91 Because
of the many factors involved in the decision to grant credit, it is difficult for
applicants to determine whether or not they are really being discriminated
against. Without written explanations, it would be almost impossible for an
applicant to prove that discrimination had occurred.
The real problem with written explanations is assuring that creditors give
the true reasons for the denial. Certainly no creditor will openly admit that
he has discriminated against an applicant.9 2 This problem might be allevi-
ated by requiring creditors to retain records. If a rejected applicant believes
either that the reason for denial in itself is discriminatory or that it is merely
a pretext for a discriminatory purpose, he could examine the records of those
applicants similarly situated to determine if he has actually been treated dif-
ferently. While the original Equal Credit Opportunity Act made no provi-
sion regarding written explanations, Regulation B requires creditors to retain
records for each applicant for a period of 15 months after action has been
87. Id. at 653. Congress has been accused of engaging in legislative overkill because
the provisions of the original Equal Credit Opportunity Act had not yet gone into effect
when the amendments were being made. See also 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 7
(remarks of Senator Brock).
88. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296-a (McKinney 1974).
89. See Testimony of Werner H. Kamarsky, Commissioner, Division of Human
Rights, State of New York, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 42.
90. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 209 (remarks of Senator Biden). However, the
American Retail Federation pointed out that it would be foolhardy to leave such a task
to a clerk or secretary when a technical violation could result in potential liability. Tes-
timony of Jim Godfrey, representing the American Retail Federation, id. at 406.
91. Experience under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), indi-
cates that the filing of vexatious complaints should not prove to be a problem. Letter
Response of Center for National Policy Review, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 479.
92. Statement of Interbank Card Association on S. 1297, 1975 Hearings, supra note
1, at 585.
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taken.93  It is imperative that this provision be retained, for without it the
utility of written explanations could be lost.94
One of the major concerns of creditors regarding the use of written ex-
planations has been the danger that their determination of what con-
stitutes a sufficient statement could later be held by a court to be inade-
quate. The amendments require that the statements contain the "specific
reasons for adverse action."95 This standard does not provide creditors with
clear guidelines, since it is susceptible to varying interpretations. To protect
creditors from such technical violations, an "immunity" provision has been
added to the Act. This provision protects creditors from liability for any act
done in "good faith in conformity with any official rule, regulation, or inter-
pretation thereof by the [Federal Reserve] Board." 96  Pursuant to this pro-
vision, creditors may submit questions to the Board and rely on its answers
as a "good faith" defense in case of subsequent prosecution. The courts are
not bound by these interpretations, but a judicial determination contrary to
an opinion issued by the 'Board would not have an adverse retroactive im-
pact on a creditor who had relied on the interpretation.97
B. Regulation B
The issuance of regulations to implement the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act amendments has proven to be the most difficult task with which the Fed-
eral Reserve Board was charged. The present regulations have been sub-
jected to a great deal of criticism for their failure to provide creditors with
clear and meaningful guidelines. Following the passage of the 1976 amend-
ments, proposed regulations were issued and subjected to comment at public
hearings. In contrast to the existing regulations, the new regulations re-
flect clear and concise draftsmanship and can be expected to alleviate many
of the problems that creditors face under the present regulations.
At the hearings held before the issuance of the new regulations,9" con-
sumer groups were especially concerned about credit scoring and urged that
creditors be required to use systems that are based on their own business ex-
93. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1976).
94. The amended regulation not only retains this provision, but also increases the
period of retention to 25 months to comply with the extension of the statute of limita-
tions by two years under the amendments. 42 Fed. Reg. 1261 (1977) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b)).
95. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (3) (Supp. 2, 1976).
96. Id. § 1691e(e).
97. Id.
98. Hearings on the 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Before
the Federal Reserve Board (Apr. 27, .1976) (on file at the Federal Reserve Board).
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periences, as opposed to one general system which all would be required to
follow.99 This proposal is based on the fact that characteristics of credit-
worthiness vary from one area of the country to another.100 If a uniform
system were required, creditors would be forced to use averages, thereby in-
creasing their risk of loss in some areas of the country and decreasing the
availability of credit to credit-worthy applicants in other areas. The new or
amended regulations recognize these concerns and require creditors to base
their scoring systems on their own experience or that of a similarly situated
creditor if the creditor does not have sufficient experience of his own. 10 1
The 1976 amendments allow creditors to use age in a statistically sound
credit scoring system as long as elderly applicants are not assigned a negative
value.'0 2 Pursuant to this provision, the regulations require that elderly ap-
plicants be given a score which reflects the creditor's experience with that
age group, but which is not less than the score for the age group receiving
the highest value in the creditor's scoring system.1'0 3 While the proposed reg-
ulations did not provide a numerical definition for "elderly," following sharp
criticism by creditors, the final regulations have provided that an applicant
will be considered "elderly" once he or she has reached the age of 62.104 Al-
though such a definition is admittedly arbitrary, some guideline is essential
for the protection of creditors and the Board is to be commended for its recog-
nition of this problem.
Although the Act does not so require,' 0 5 the Board has decided that credi-
99. Statement of Robert B. Norris, General Counsel, National Consumer Finance
Association, Hearings on the 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Before the Federal Reserve Board 42 (Apr. 27, 1976) (on file at the Federal Reserve
Board).
100. Cremer Testimony, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 435.
101. 42 Fed. Reg. 1253 (1977) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)). The
regulations also require the scoring system to be one that uses a numerical score to
predict the applicant's probable willingness and financial ability to repay the loan. Id.
at 1243.
102. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b) (3) (Supp. 2, 1976).
103. 42 Fed. Reg. 1253 (1977) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(v)). For
example, if the highest value is assigned to the 60-69 age group, then a 70-year old
applicant could not receive a lesser value. Fed. Res. Bd. Press Release (Jul. 15, 1976)
at 11. Creditors have criticized this provision claiming that "blackballing" against the
elderly will be prevented if they are given the same value as the age group receiving
the lowest score. Statement of H.R. Lively, Director of Public Affairs, Sears, Roebuck
& Co., Hearings on the 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Before
the Federal Reserve Board 16-17 (Aug. 12, 1976) [hereinafter cited as FRB Hearings]
(on file at the Federal Reserve Board). In fact, the language of the bill seems to sup-
port the Board's proposed regulation since any value other than the highest score given
for age would be a negative factor when compared to an age group receiving a higher
score.
104. 42 Fed. Reg. 1253 (1977) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(o)).
105. Nevertheless, the Act does authorize the Board to prescribe such regulations
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tors will be required to keep records on credit applicants reflecting sex, race,
age, and other factors which are prohibited bases of discrimination.106 Such a
provision will greatly aid the various enforcement agencies by providing
a regular means for monitoring the creditors' performance under the Act.
The agencies will be able to examine the records to determine whether a
disproportionate number of applicants from a particular category are being
denied credit. This regulation, however, only requires creditors to re-
cord these factors in those cases where an applicant seeks credit for
the purchase of residential property.107 This limitation is grounded in the
concern that a notation requirement would be too costly and burdensome if
required in all forms of credit extension. 0 8 Additionally, creditors have tes-
tified that asking such questions could prove to be a public relations problem
and that some applicants might refuse to answer them.' 0 9
A better provision would limit the characteristics which must be recorded
to those that are visible to the creditor,"10 but would apply the requirement to
all forms of credit."' Such a provision would have the advantage of provid-
ing a means of surveillance for most forms of credit and yet reducing the bur-
den placed upon creditors. In addition, by limiting the characteristics to be
recorded to those that are visible, creditors will not be faced with the prob-
lem of borrowers who are offended by such questions.
Although information on characteristics such as marital status, age, and re-
ligion would also be helpful to the enforcement agencies, requiring creditors
to ask applicants these questions could have the anomalous effect of increas-
as are necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (Supp. V,
1975).
106. 42 Fed. Reg. 1261 (1977) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.13(a)). Under
this provision, creditors will be required to record the applicant's sex, marital status,
race, national origin, and age. id.
107. Id.
108. Remarks of Governor Partee to Testimony of Roger S. Kuhn, Center for Na-
tional Policy Review, FRB Hearings, supra note 103, at 91.
109. Statement of G. Carlton Lind, representing the National Association of Mutual
Savings Banks, FRB Hearings, supra note 103, at 38.
110. Under this system, only race, sex, and national origin would be recorded. The
category of national origin could encompass broad categories obvious to the creditor
such as Asian, Indian, and Spanish. See Fed. Res. Bd. Press Release (Jul. 15, 1976)
at 38-40.
111. Statement of J: Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, FRB Hearings, supra note 103, at 116-17. This would
necessarily be limited to personal interviews and would not cover applications for credit
cards made by mail or by telephone. However, Mr. Pottinger pointed out that the De-
partment has other means of checking on such accounts. For example, they could check
to see if an inordinate number of denials involved persons living in predominantly Black
areas or persons with Spanish or Jewish surnames. Id. at 117.
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ing the possibility of discrimination in these areas. Such a provision would
require creditors to ask about the prohibited characteristics, yet prohibit cred-
itors from considering them in the final decision. Additionally, the potential
of litigation would be increased, since an applicant might incorrectly perceive
that he had been discriminated against simply because the creditor asked
about his marital status or religion. 112
IV. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATION
Because discrimination is so difficult to detect and prevent, it is imperative
that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act be stringently enforced. For this rea-
son, the most important provision in the amendments may prove to be that
which authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to institute civil
proceedings. 113 As previously noted, the Federal Trade Commission and
many of the other federal agencies to whom enforcement is entrusted do not
have adequate enforcement powers. Furthermore, testimony received by the
Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs showed that federal bank regula-
tory agencies are generally reluctant to take public action against institutions
under their jurisdiction for fear of jeopardizing public confidence in the of-
fending institution.1 4  Additionally, such agencies are faced with a built-in
conflict of interest, in that they are charged with protecting the rights of con-
sumers as well as with protecting the banks from the financial loss which
would result from a large recovery in a class action suit. 1 5 The authority of
the Attorney General to proceed on his own initiative should act as an incen-
tive to the other regulatory agencies to enforce compliance by offending credi-
tors promptly." 6 Additionally, the Justice Department has the benefit of ex-
perience with other civil rights statutes, experience which other regulatory
agencies lack.
112. Id. at 128.
113. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(h) (Supp. 2, 1976).
114. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 26 (supplemental statement of Congresswoman
Sullivan). Ms. Sullivan noted that in at least one case, a bank official who repeatedly
violated the Truth in Lending Act was not persuaded to comply until the regulatory
agency stressed the danger of a potentially large class action. See also News Release
of Senator Proxmire, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 480. A survey done by the Comp-
troller of the Currency showed the administration's failure to enforce the 1968 Fair
Housing Act. Four agencies, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
Depository Insurance Corporation, regulate the financial institutions which provide the
majority of funds for home financing. Under Title 8 of the Act, discrimination in
mortgage lending is illegal, but since the passage of the Act the administration has
failed to bring a single suit.
115. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 26 (supplemental statement of Congress-
woman Sullivan).
116. See id. at 27.
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Although the enforcement powers of the Attorney General have the poten-
tial for achieving effective compliance, this objective will not be realized un-
less the Justice Department fulfills its intended role. The requirement of an-
nual reports to Congress from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
and the Attorney General should operate to prevent administrative inaction
by providing a regular vehicle for congressional oversight.' 17 The provision
requires the Attorney General and the Board to make reports concerning the
administration of their functions under the Act and also requires the 'Board
to evaluate the extent to which compliance with the requirements of the Act
is being achieved and to submit a summary of the enforcement actions taken
by each of the regulatory agencies. 118
While the enforcement powers entrusted to the Attorney General should
prove to be effective, private litigation will continue to play an important role.
For this reason, it is important that the civil liability provisions of the Act
be designed so that aggrieved consumers are not discouraged from instituting
private suits. In cases of this nature, the consumer rarely suffers any measur-
able damages 1 9 and while the Act does provide for punitive damages, courts
generally refrain from granting the maximum amount. Furthermore, al-
though the Act provides for the award of reasonable attorney's fees, 120 law-
yers may be reluctant to take a case which promises such a small recovery. 121
Because of these considerations, a provision should be added guaranteeing
a minimum recovery upon proof of a violation in an individual suit. The
Truth in Lending Act has such a provision 122 and, in the view of the Federal
Trade Commission, this provision has been very successful in making private
actions a significant deterrent. 23
In addition to a guaranteed minimum recovery, it is essential that potential
plaintiffs be informed of the rights and remedies available to them under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The present regulations of the Board require
creditors to inform all credit applicants that the federal 'Equal Credit Oppor-
117. Testimony of Steven M. Rohde, Center for National Policy Review, 1975
Hearings, supra note 1, at 464.
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691f (Supp. 2, 1976).
119. Feldman Testimony, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 218. In most cases, actual
damages would be limited to the cost incurred in locating a second creditor. Id.
120. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(d) (Supp. 2, 1976).
121. Feldman Testimony, 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 218.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970). Pursuant to this provision, the plaintiff re-
ceives a $100 minimum recovery in the event of any violation that is proven.
123. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 218. But, cf. Statement of Commissioner Nye,
id. at 224, in which the dissenting Commissioner argued that such a provision would
allow a plaintiff who had established a technical violation which resulted in no prov-
able damages to nonetheless receive $100 as a "tip" for a "good try."
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tunity Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.124
The new regulations implementing the 1976 amendments will expand this
notice to include race, color, religion, national origin, age, and receipt of
public assistance, but only require that the notice be given in cases where
adverse action is taken. 125 To facilitate public understanding of the provi-
sions of the Act, the Board also requires that the statement of action
taken, the Equal Credit Opportunity Notice, and the statement of specific
reasons for adverse action be given together.'
26
These notices will serve the dual purpose of informing consumers of their
rights and aiding them in determining whether or not they have been discrim-
inated against. Nevertheless, because some consumers inevitably will be un-
able to understand the notice, or reluctant to ask for a written statement, con-
sumer protection groups should assume the responsibility of educating and
arousing the interest of the public in the importance and potential of the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Through the enactment of the 1976 amendments to the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, Congress has done a commendable job of balancing the needs
of consumers and creditors. Recognizing the growing importance of credit
in modern society, the amendments insure that consumers will not be denied
credit on the basis of characteristics having nothing to do with credit-worthi-
ness. On the other hand, the amendments also recognize the creditors' need
for protection from financial loss by allowing them to consider factors
which are relevant to an applicant's credit-worthiness.
Significantly, the enforcement provisions of the Act reflect this concern for
balancing the needs of consumers and creditors. Creditors are protected
from liability for violations resulting from good faith reliance on the interpre-
tations of the Federal Reserve Board and consumers are offered a number
of different remedies in the case of noncompliance by a lending institution.
The requirement of a written denial will be of some aid to consumers in as-
certaining whether they have been discriminated against, without causing an
124. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(d)(1) (1976).
125. 42 Fed. Reg. 1257 (1977) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(9)). The
amended regulation requires that the notification be in writing and that it contain a
statement of the action taken, the provisions of section 1691(a) of the Act, the name
and address of the federal agency which supervises the creditor, and either a statement
of the specific reasons for the action taken or a disclosure of the applicant's right to
receive such a statement. This notification must be given to the applicant within 30
days after the creditor has received a completed application or taken an adverse action.
Id. at § 202.9(9)(2).
126. 42 Fed. Reg. 1248 (1977).
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undue burden on creditors. The administrative enforcement provisions of
the Act provide a promising vehicle for insuring maximum compliance and,
if stringently enforced, will act as an effective means of preventing discrimi-
nation in the granting of credit.
Barbara J. Klein
